What role has in-betweenness played in Turkey and Indonesia's bilateral relations with the EU and Japan respectively since 2000s?

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Introduction

Parallel to Ian Manners (2002) Normative Power Europe thesis, the European Union (EU) has been fostering democratic values and norms for decades through its external actions and diplomacy. From the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), European Endowment for Democracy (EED), enlargement processes, to the multiplicity of partnerships, the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law have been omnipresent.

However, despite the decades of democratization endeavors, from the early 2000s up until the present moment, the world has witnessed mixed results of such promotion. Democratic backsliding has concurrently been the buzzword in both academic and policy domains.

The inherent ambiguity of the EU's democratic agenda, and the growing assertiveness of external state actors are the principal, yet not exclusive, reasons behind such developments.

In terms of the structure of the global theater, multipolarity has been on the rise for decades. With the growth in economic development and military capacity, the ambition of some states has also been manifesting. With the gradually visible geopolitical competition, Europe and Asia appear to be at the center of the global stage. Partnerships and alliances under the banner of liberal democracy have been pursued. Likewise, gravity centers of authoritarian governance have also been holding hands. However, the term "Cold War 2.0" does not adequately characterize the current global space. With intimate interdependency in global supply chains which has been developed since the 1980s thanks to the growing affordability of cargo shipping, the current state of affairs is characterized by the great power competitions with entrenched interconnectedness, a rather entangled rivalry, unlike during the Cold War.

Within this evolving power structure, there are states who find themselves in-between great powers in terms of culture, history, geography, and governance model. In-betweenness is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the space for sovereign decision making could be oppressed by the power constraints. On the other hand, the multiple layers of belonging have the potential to capacitate in-between states with leverage and relational capital when negotiating their national interests.

In the European theater, Turkey, which bridges the African-European-Asian continent, emerges as one prominent in-between case in point. This dynamic is visibly manifested by the Turkish engagement in the United Nations (UN)'s Black Sea Grain Initiative following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The recent approval of Finland's membership in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with Turkey's conditionalities also appears to be one of the ironies of history, seen from

the lens of Turkey's application for EU membership since 1999.

On the Asia-Pacific stage, Southeast-Asian countries find themselves in between two giants, the US and China. In this power dynamic, Japan also plays a significant role in counterbalancing China, as one of the most important American allies in East Asia. Leader of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and regional hegemon, Indonesia seems to be gradually active in bridging the conflicting worldviews of major powers with the incumbent president Joko Widodo (also known as Jokowi) coming into power in 2014. The elegant success of Widodo as the host of the 2022 G20 Bali summit at the height of heated tensions between the US and China, along with the ongoing War in Ukraine was the best practice of Indonesia's in-between diplomacy. At this event, Widodo was able to put Biden and Xi on the same negotiation table, and Zelensky on the screen while Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov being in the room.

From the above preliminary overview, several questions may arise: what have gone wrong with the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law from the EU towards Turkey? What characterizes the relations between Japan and Indonesia? How do Turkey and Indonesia employ in-betweenness to advance their national interests? Synthesizing them together, what role has in-betweenness played in Turkey and Indonesia's bilateral relations with the EU and Japan respectively since 2000s? Given the material and symbolic power of the US in all these, its role in shaping the interactive dynamics will also be illustrated in the analysis.

Graph 1: A tale of two regions: structural conditions and agency of the in-between

With the growing complexity of world affairs, with the ones mentioned above being just a handful of examples, multidisciplinary approaches are needed more than ever to decipher the big trends and the nuances of global politics. Situating at the crossroad of international relations, comparative politics, and area studies (Europe and Asia), while drawing inspiration from history, economics, and international law, this paper explores the changes and continuities of Turkey and Indonesia's in-betweenness

in their foreign policy making, and how this lens helps us understand the evolution of the bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey, Japan and Indonesia.

In the following, I will first present the theoretical framework of classical realism as the analytical lens employed in addressing the questions raised. This will be followed by (I) the disentanglement of the ambiguities of the EU's promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in its international relations, and the case of Turkey, (II) relations between Japan and Indonesia, and (III) Turkey and Indonesia's in-betweenness compared: linkage between domestic diverse identities and external balancing acts. The conclusion will synthesize the analysis and mention the limitations of the paper.

Theoretical framework: Classical Realism and Analytical Eclecticism

Attentive to the constant reshuffling of power balance in international relations, classical realism appears to offer us with the most adequate equipment to analyze the regional political dynamics at play.

For the purpose of this paper, realism is understood as the philosophical point of departure to viewing the world. A more elaborated definition is adopted from Kirshner's (2022):

> "realism is not a 'theory'—it is a point of departure, a philosophical disposition, an approach associated with a constellation of theories that derive from a set of commonly shared assumptions. As such, a variety of contrasting, even competing theories can be developed following this tradition. Thus although any particular theory informed by realism can be evaluated for its deductive logic and empirical consistency, 'Realism,' like any philosophical disposition, cannot be 'proven wrong'" (13).

A fundamental assumption of realism is the absence of a supreme political authority in international relations. As such, "states (or any set of groups dwelling in anarchy) must be attentive to the balance of power (that is, to the potential capabilities of others), to the distribution of those capabilities across states, and, most crucially, to changes to the balance of power over time" (Kirshner 2022: 14). The centrality of the state while not dismissing the important roles of non-state actors and market forces is another pillar of realism. Beyond the anarchy assumption, states "must also attend to the intentions of others (an enormous problem as such intentions, especially projecting into the future, can never be known with certainty), as behavior in world politics is a function of both power and purpose" (idem). While power "may be the ultimate arbiter of disputes between states…purpose—what states want—will define the nature and intensity of the disputes between them" (idem).

As Jonathan Kirshner (2022) convincingly argues, contrary to the reductionist hyper-rational realism, with rationality rooted in Rational Expectations Theory (RET),

as well as deterministic structural realism, epitomized by Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979) and Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), classical realism takes both the structural of international relations and actors' agency into account. As such, contingency of circumstances and political choices, as well as uncertainty are core pillars of classical realism.

Justifying the rejection of Hegelian-Marxist determinism inherent in structural realist assumptions, Robert Gilpin (1983) put forward the argument that "although it is certainly possible to identify crises, disequilibrium, and incompatible elements in a political system, especially a disjuncture between the governance of the system and the underlying distribution of power, it is most certainly not possible to predict the outcome." And indeed, "we do not possess a predictive theory of social change in any sphere; we probably never shall" (47).

The graph below situates the role of constructivism within sub-categories of realism and liberalism. In this demarcation, constructivism lies on the perpendicular line to both realism and liberalism. Here, content refers to the ideational and normative substance of foreign policy approaches, as well as the purpose of external actions.

FIGURE 3. Liberalism, Realism, and Constructivism.

Graph 2: Liberalism, Realism and Constructivism (Kirshner 2022: 76)

"Classical Realism is markedly distinguished by a number of additional attributes, including, importantly: that structure matters, but it is irretrievably indeterminate; the central role of history in understanding world politics; and attentiveness to content (that is, to both power and purpose)—all of which imply that attention to aspects of domestic politics and ideational variables are necessary to understand state behavior" (Kirshner 2022: 45).

The rejection of the rigid distinction or even wars of paradigm between realism and constructivism has been manifested even before. In *Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory* (2010), J. Samuel Barkin first explains the misleading nature of the idealism/ materialism opposition by arguing that "it paints as an ontological distinction what is really an epistemological distinction…and because it

obscures questions of historicity that are central to both constructivism and to classical realism" (48). Building from this argument, Barkin (2010) then portraits the analysis of foreign policies from the perspective of classical realism as holistic as it takes into consideration both material and ideational factors. Prominent symbols of such approaches are Hans Morgenthau's *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (1947) and *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948), as well as Raymond Aron's *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (1962).

To understand the change and continuities of international organizations and institutions, scholars have turned to historical institutionalism for analytical perspectives (Brecher and Harvey 2002; Fioretos 2011; Rixen, Viola, and Zürn 2016). I think the applicability of historical institutionalism extends beyond international organizations in the domain of international relations. If we perceive the foreign policy of a given political entity as an institution, its change and continuities can legitimately be explained by schools of thoughts in institutionalism. Specifically, one can indeed attempt to process-trace the incremental changes in foreign policy institutions with historical institutionalist lenses and complement this with constructivist institutionalist approaches to deconstruct the intersubjectivity of "ideas of institutions" (Hay et al. 2008; Hay 2017). The latter is particularly attentive towards the ways in which actors politicize and define the norms of institutions, followed by how the actors justify the architecture and functionality of institutions/ instruments with such norms. In doing so, the political contingency and power relations of actors are explicitly analyzed as explanatory factors of institutional character.

While the combination of historical and constructivist institutionalism is widely employed in the discipline of political economy, given the interconnectedness of global economy and international relations, predating but accelerated by globalization since 1980s, such approach may provide fruitful insights into the study of international relations. This insight may be particularly helpful in deconstructing the nexus of trade and security relations among polities.

In foreign policy analysis, the notion of "national interest" is particularly enigmatic due to its multifaced and contingent nature. It is defined by political actors who have the power to do so. It is conditioned by both structural factors such as the military capacity and economic architecture and ideational factors such as culture, ideology, history, and values. It in turn shapes the structural and ideational factors when realized.

With the attentiveness towards both the structural conditions (with historical institutionalist lenses) and political contingency along with agency of actors (with constructivist perspectives), classical realism offers a holistic analytical framework to assess the transformations of foreign policies.

An unconventional yet honest articulation on the study of international relations is offered by Kirshner (2022):

"The study of world politics will never be a science, at least as the way that term is conventionally used. To understand, explain, and anticipate events in international relations, it is necessary to have an instinct for and attentiveness to politics, a facility with rudimentary economic theory, and a grasp of the relevant history— in all cases tempered by self-consciousness about what simply cannot be known and the inescapable limits to the objectivity of the analyst. Or what might be thought of in another setting as approaching the task at hand armed with three chords and (a constant striving for) the truth" (239).

Allowing space for contingency does not mean giving complete explanatory power to uncertainty nor abandoning analytical rigor. Rather, it is the honest recognition of the validity of assumptions and the limits of analysis in political science. It is not and can never be scientific the same way natural science is. But this does not imply that it is not rigorous. It is because

"Social relations are slippery, and causes and effects of social phenomena invariably change over time, complexities that are compounded by the fact that events will lend themselves to a multiplicity of interpretations. This is not nihilism—to the contrary, it is analytical modesty, and an attentiveness to the discipline required to distinguish what, as students of world politics, we can and cannot hope to achieve" (Kirshner 2022: 5).

While classical realism can be argued to be attentive to both material and ideational factors into foreign policy analysis, as a meta-theory that has developed multiple schools of thoughts, its diverse theoretical underpinnings can be both an opportunity and an obstacle.

Inspired by analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010), in different parts of the analysis, I may need to complement specific frameworks in classical realism with other theoretical lenses such as social constructivist and institutionalist schools of thoughts, literature on polarization, state-society relations, the role of religion in politics, etc. The choices, however, are not randomly made. They have to be justified by logical coherence and analytical rigor.

As explained by the pioneers of analytical eclecticism:

"Analytic eclecticism represents such an effort at blending, a means for scholars to guard against the risks of excessive reliance on a single analytic perspective. This is particularly true when it comes to understanding intersections and interactions among multiple social processes in different domains of social reality. Peter Hall (2003, p. 387) notes that the ontologies guiding the study of politics are increasingly characterized by 'more extensive endogeneity and the ubiquity of complex interaction effects.' Accordingly, analytic eclecticism refuses to exclude certain

aspects of social phenomena from the framework of analysis simply for the purpose of satisfying boundary conditions and scholarly conventions linked to a priori paradigmatic assumptions. Instead, it trains its sights on the connections and interactions among a wide range of causal forces normally analyzed in isolation from one another" (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 12).

The narrowing down of theoretical choices will come concurrently with the selection of empirical assessments in order "to find a workable balance between empirical richness and analytical rigor" (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 101).

Equipped with classical realist foundations and analytical eclecticist insights, we will now turn to the first section: ambiguities of the EU's democracy promotion.

(I) The Ambiguities of the EU's Promotion of Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law in its international relations: the case of Turkey

We will first critically assess the ambiguities of the EU's promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in general, before turning to the case of Turkey, on its rugged road to Europe.

(A) Normative Power Europe: lighthouse keeper of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law?

One prominent ENP scholar, Tanja Börzel "challenges the conventional wisdom of the West promoting democracy and 'the illiberal rest' promoting autocracy" (520) in *The noble west and the dirty rest? Western democracy promoters and illiberal regional powers* (2015) by "exploring the impact of non-democratic regional powers, such as Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia, on US and EU democracy promotion" (idem). She discovers that "western democracies do not unequivocally engage in democracy promotion. Similar to nondemocratic regimes, they have a tendency to prioritize stability and security over democratic change" (idem). Meanwhile, "non-democratic regimes do not necessarily engage in autocracy promotion. Rather, they seek to undermine Western efforts at democracy promotion if they see their political and economic interests or their political survival at stake" (idem). And finally, "domestic factors are much more relevant for the (in-)effectiveness of international democracy promotion than the activities of non-democratic actors" (idem).

Refining Börzel (2015)'s assessment further, Aydın-Düzgit (2020) informs us that non-democracy can also conduct "democracy-support" policies to advance their economic and political interests. Furthermore, "the primacy of strategic drivers in democracy support is not unique to non-democracies. It can be argued that this is so often the case in established Western democracies such as the US" (278). It is also the case "in other non-Western democracies such as Japan and India which have both

invested in international democracy support mainly as a way to push back China" (idem). Drawing from Turkey's engagement in the Arab Spring, Aydın-Düzgit (2020) argues further that "non-democracies may even be more active than democratic governments in supporting democratic transitions, dependent on the extent of the strategic stakes served by democracy" (idem).

At first glance, this may seem paradoxical. But closer inspection into the entanglement of decision-making calculus, one finds that power is intricately entrenched into the formation of interest and norms. As such, while the projection of power may be latent, it is nevertheless present in all formulations of interest and the construction of norms (Graph 3).

Graph 3: Entanglement of decision-making

There are countless examples where strategic interests and pragmatic concerns trump democratic values in the EU's diplomatic approaches, within and beyond its neighborhood. To mention just a few, in "an interview conducted in March 2014, Jerzy Pomianowski states that … Some embassies in Azerbaijan do not want to be seen funding democracy projects when negotiating an energy deal. In many cases, EU member states want to remain neutral" (Tordjman 2017: 9).

In another ENP country, Georgia, although "the EU claims that resilience should not be conflated with support for authoritarian stability, it can be observed that the resilience turn coincided with a period of EU's relative passivity towards Georgia both in terms of democratic conditionality and new incentives" (Lebanidze 2020: 2).
In the same report, Lebanidze (2020) argues that "more attention to resilience measures, which is more focused on capacity building and output legitimacy…may tempt the EU to further neglect democracy and human rights in its neighborhood. The recent reenergizing relations with autocratic countries such as Belarus and Egypt prove this trend" (3).

Relations with China and Russia have also been documented to be particularly strategic and value-free as "normative goals are often overridden by more mundane economic or strategic interests" (Forsberg 2011: 1194-1195). In the Western Balkans, the EU and the US "often emphasized the strategic containment of radical Islam or of Russian influence over value-driven policy goals such as democracy consolidation and the rule of law" (Bieber and Tzifakis 2020: 264).

Inconsistency in the application of norms is also widely observed. According to Mayer, "the EU aims to apply human rights provisions in trade agreement consistently but, in reality, different trade agreements have seen different interpretations of such rights" (2013:108).

Critical scholars on the Normative Power Europe thesis such as Sjursen further ask the question "…whether or not normative power is simply an expression of (Eurocentric) imperialism? …whether or not the foreign policy of a normative or civilising power may be considered legitimate at all and, if so, on what grounds" (2015: 208).

In *Empire in Denial* (2006), Chandler argues more bluntly that the "state-building process of EU enlargement has been able to be highly regulatory precisely on the basis that the regulatory mechanisms invest political responsibility in the candidate counties while denying the EU's domination" (97). Beyond power asymmetry is the latent pursuit of economic and security interests of the EU, which

> "is a much more complex and ambiguous one, that of the denial of power: the desire to avoid any investigation of their interests, of *their* capacities. State-building is the practice of denying empire. The problem with non-Western states from the Balkans to Africa is their subordination and weakness in relation to the Western powers. It is this subordination which raises awkard questions of policy responses and of political responsibilities and above all the question of Western political purpose: what does the West have to offer? This question is an unsettling one for Western governments and international institutions which acutely feel the lack of a sense of political purpose today and fear their inability to act in a way that openly projects their power" (Chandler 2006: 190).

The implicit pursuit of interest and projection of power, hidden by the technocratic language to de-politicize the debates further helps the EU to circumvent political responsibilities and accountabilities.

Analyzing the innovations in strategies of democracy support with the introduction of European Endowment for Democracy (EED), Tordjman (2017) highlights the ambivalent role of ambiguity in bringing about effective pluralism in authoritarian environments. Intriguingly, while "ambiguity may serve as an enabling factor and generate consensus around misunderstandings that are usually well

recognised by the relevant stakeholders, it may also affect the coherence, legitimacy and efficiency of the interventions, especially when new democracy support devices are exhibited in parallel to political negotiations that may lead to compromises over respect towards human rights and advancement of political liberties" (11).

Another mechanism of ambiguity lies in the informalization of the EU's international relations. According to Fahey and Bazerkoska, "EU international relations are increasingly subject to degrees of informalisation, where soft law or non-binding instruments are used in key EU international relations contexts of controversy, evading scrutiny, judicial review, institutional analysis, and removing citizen scrutiny" (2022: 255).

The rise in the replacement of binding bilateral or multilateral agreements by soft law instruments is also well-documented in the literature (Ott 2020 and Wessel 2021). Parallel to this is the employment of the vague terms such as "strategic partnership" in plenty of the EU's documents relating to its external relations. While the ambiguity allows flexibility for political maneuver facing uncertainty, the normative values of the rule of law and democratic accountability that the EU has preached to other actors for decades are potentially undermined.

Following these lines of critique, there is little surprise that while there is "empirical support for the thesis that the EU is recognized as being a model with regard to various norms in world politics…there is also skepticism as to whether the EU lives up to its own professed ideals" (Forsberg 2011: 1198).

(B) The case of Turkey: rugged road to Europe

Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the pivotal geographical position, multicultural demography, and the Ottoman history have made the competing narratives of identities and governance model inevitable.

Turkish nationalism represents an orthogonal dimension to the dichotomous narratives of Kemalist western-style modernization and neo-Ottoman embracement of the cultural and religious roots. While the political and cultural realities are much more nuanced, Table 1 offers a preliminary comparison to highlight their distinctness.

	Kemalism	Neo-Ottomanism
Governance model	Democracy	Authoritarianism
Religious position	Secularism	Sunni-Islam dominance
Economic policy	Corporatism	Neoliberalism
Civilizational vision	(western) Modernization	Traditional conservatism
Symbolic figure	Mustafa Kemal Atatürk	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political party	Republican People's Party	Justice and Development

	(CHP)	Party (AKP)

Table 1: Comparison between Kemalism and Neo-Ottomanism

The in-betweenness of Turkey stems from both its internal competing narratives and external strategic calculus of power balance. The relations between Turkey and the EU are also largely influenced by the competing visions for the organization of state and society. Thus, "when looking at the costs and benefits, it is important to look at a state's options, assess how reforms may affect domestic politics, and examine the standing of the EU within the target country" (Kubicek 2011: 912).

At the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey obtained the official candidate status for EU membership. Nevertheless, while the "European Council in Helsinki recognized Turkey's candidacy," it "stopped short of opening accession negotiations, arguing that the country first had to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria for membership" (Tocci 2011: 4).

From the late 1990s and the early 2000s, Europeanization was popular in the general political discourse. Echoing Table 1, Üstün (2018) informs us that there were two competing perceptions on the journey to EU membership: "a process for achieving the level of contemporary civilization Atatürk set as the target for modern Turkey" and "a way imperialist forces could dictate their interests" (15). But such diverging views did not explicitly undermine Turkish aspiration to join the EU.

When the AKP came to power in 2002, former university professor, Ahmet Davutoğlu, was appointed as Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister and Ambassador-at-Large. He later became the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009) and the Prime Minister (2014). His book *Strategic Depth* (2001) became the blueprint for the Turkish foreign policy making, which is characterized by strengthening relations with countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Europe, and Russia. Growing diplomatic activeness was also observed in international organizations like the UN. These developments were at the time, "perceived as aligned with the ENP…seen as a part of the Europeanization process" (Üstün 2018: 33).

From 2002 to 2005, the opening of membership chapters marks the target to be fulfilled by the incumbent AKP government. "Yet since the opening of accession negotiations in 2005, the 1999-2005 golden years in EU-Turkey relations have come to a (temporary) halt, as the relationship has slipped back into a vicious dynamic" (Tocci 2011: 4).

With the open opposition from leaders of the member states, notably President Nicolas Sarkozy and Chancellor Angela Merkel, "In 2007, France blocked the opening of an additional five chapters" (Tocci 2011: 5).

The ongoing disputes between northern and southern Cyprus makes the road to

Europe even more rugged. "Achieving a solution in Cyprus is not an explicit condition for Turkey's EU membership. However, … In everything but name, a solution in Cyprus has become a condition for Turkey's EU membership" (Tocci 2011: 121).

The stranded process of EU membership due to overwhelmingly political concerns undermines the credibility of the EU in remaining committed. Concurrently, Turkish aspiration of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, anchored in Europeanization gradually becomes delusional. Following the systemic drawbacks in Europeanization, AKP and the ruling conglomerate started to formulate alternative plans. The moral panic (Üstün 2018) and psychological scar then become symbolic deposits to be instrumentalized, and stigmatized by the ruling elites when opportunities arise.

Meanwhile, the EU and US' approaches to political liberalization often coincide with economic liberalization, to the detrimental effects on real democratic progress. Baylies' (1995) example of Africa is applicable elsewhere, including Turkey: "while political conditionalities may assist the development of democratic movements … there is an irony in that structural adjustment risks undermining the state reforms seen to be essential to them while, equally, democratisation may challenge the process of economic restructuring being imposed" (321).

Nowadays, the most important relations between the EU and Turkey appears to be the EU-Turkey Statement on migration management reached in 2016. The EU's externalization of migration policy to avoid responsibility and accountability while respecting the non-refoulement legal norms has been well documented in the academic and policy literature (Lehner 2019, Dagi 2020, Yilmaz-Elmas 2020, Kassoti and Idriz 2022 just to name a few).

(II) Relations between Japan and Indonesia

Contrary to the relations between the EU and Turkey which see parallel development between normative and pragmatic concerns, the relations between Japan and Indonesia are characterized by the salience of pragmatism throughout. The absence of the membership prospect due to the difference in nature of polities between Japan as a state and the EU as a regional integrative entity is another major difference between the two bilateral relations.

Japan and Indonesia established diplomatic relations in 1958, in the midst of Indonesia's anti-colonial struggles between 1945 and 1949. Approaching the end of the colonization by the Dutch East Indies from 1800 to 1949, in 1942, the Empire of Japan invaded southeast Asia, including the nowadays Indonesia. The Japanese occupation ended in 1945, with the defeat of the empire by the Allied forces. It is useful to put the relations between Japan and Indonesia into historical perspectives, in comparison with

other lines of linkage. Beyond the Japanese occupation, and the Dutch colonization, the historical dominance of Chinese empires in east Asia also feeds into the Indonesia's fear and mistrust of foreign powers (Novotny 2010).

The colonial history makes Indonesia wary of foreign governments' influence on its political and economic sovereignty. In 1955, Indonesia's first president Sukarno hosted the Afro–Asian Conference in Bandung, West Java. This conference laid out the foundation for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for newly independent states in Asia and Africa, during the Cold War.

As a resource-lacking country, Japan's foreign policy has been largely characterized by pragmatic concerns over resource-extraction. The mercantilist approach was shared by other investors. "A PSI leader…characterized both Japanese and American investors as 'vultures'" (Weinstein 1976: 281).

With the "economic miracles" during the *Trente Glorieuses* (roughy 1945 to 1973) and the dismantlement of the Gold Standard in the 1980s, the appreciation of the yen elevates the cost of labor. This, in turn, reduces the global competitiveness of Japanese firms. To boost economic competitiveness, the Japanese government set up Official Development Assistance (ODA) to build infrastructure for economic activities to flourish, financed by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in southeast Asian countries and beyond.

The logic of the developmental state (Katada 2020) has been prominent in east Asia. And as Chang (2015) convincingly argues in *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*, protectionist state-led industry building has been the most effective way to build the economy from scratch, applicable to rising economies and mature economies alike.

Following the utilitarian logic, "Japan may place a lower priority on democracy aid because democratic development in recipient countries does not directly provide economic benefits to Japan" (Ichihara 2016: 912). Indeed, pragmatic concerns and non-intervention doctrine were the dominant lines of thinking in Japan's foreign policy making. Only when Japan was pressured by western states did it incorporate democracy promotion in its ODA. As illustrated by Ichihara (2016):

"The inclusion of democracy promotion as one of the purposes of Japanese foreign

aid provision partially resulted from *gaiatsu* for that purpose. The tepid Japanese

response to the military crackdown on pro-democracy movements in Burma and

China at the end of the1980s led the media in the US and Europe to criticize Japan.

This criticism at least partially led political parties on the governing and opposing

sides…to move toward the creation of the ODA Charter of 1992 (the first guidelines

on Japanese foreign aid), which stated that Japan would provide foreign aid by paying

attention to the direction of democratization in recipient countries" (911).

Following this development, since the 2000s, democracy promotion has been systematically incorporated into the Japanese ODA and foreign policies. In 2006, the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity initiative was launched by Foreign Minister Taro Aso. The Abe administration also targets the rule of law and democratic governance as the priorities in national security and foreign policy gestures. "This is an ostensible departure from the country's traditional foreign policy posture, which has avoided bringing values to the forefront of foreign policy" (Ichihara 2016: 905).

With the rise of China and the assertive leadership of Xi Jinping who came to power in 2013. The Abe administration also prepares more hawkish policy announcements such as Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in 2016.

"Faced with the growing power of China" there is also "an increasing convergence of interests and common strategic outlook between Jakarta and Tokyo…In the context of the uncertainty that arises from the rise of China, several leaders emphasized that there is a need for Japan to stay engaged in the security arrangements in Southeast Asia" (Novotny 2010: 279). The counterweight offered by the multiplicity of foreign partners is the most dominant logic of foreign policy making throughout Indonesian diplomatic history. However, due to the urgency of domestic infrastructure-building and the need for funds, Indonesia does not always have the say in front of major foreign investors.

The geopolitical rivalry between Japan and China can also be observed in their competing bids in the high-speed railway construction plans connecting Jakarta and Bandung. The governmental agency of ODA, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), proposed a soft loan to conduct the project in the 2010s. However, China offered cheaper deals with the waiver of official loan guarantee. Following his trips to both Tokyo and Beijing in 2015, President Widodo finally decided to opt for the Chinese bid. Both economic and political calculations were decisive, following intense lobbying of both countries. "Yet when it opens in July [2023] it will be several hundred million dollars over budget and four years behind schedule, because of pandemic-related, land-acquisition and other delays and environmental controversies" (The Economist 2023: 47).

(III) Turkey and Indonesia's in-betweenness compared: linkage between domestic diverse identities and external balancing acts

"Since the mid-2000s, the world has increasingly witnessed the emergence of new poles of powers from the Global South challenging the long prevailed global distribution of power among the immediate post-Cold War era's winning Western countries" (Parlar Dal 2022: 1). Established in 2008, G20 marks the milestone of global reshuffling of power balance.

In the era of multipolarity, rising economies and states may favor a transformation of global order to better reflect the distribution of power. In 2013, Fontaine and Kliman estimates that:

> "The more likely scenario is fragmentation of the global order. Principles which the order has advanced would become less universally binding; different parts of the world would interpret and apply the order's principles based on local consensus or the desires of the regionally dominant power. And institutions and arrangements that have successfully regulated key areas of state behavior would become less effective as they are replicated. Such fragmentation would be inimical to all countries that depend upon an open and stable world for their peace and prosperity" (97).

While "changes to the balance of power over time" may be the "primal engine of conflict" (Kirshner 2022: 14), if such transformation can be wisely managed by both established powers and newly emerged giants, the new global order has the potential to become more democratic and just.

As neighbors to the EU and Japan, Turkey and Indonesia have the greatest potential to become the new regional hegemons, if they have the purpose in mind and the capacity to act. While the mounting normative dissensus and contestation over the world order are as old as international relations, with the rise of China and assertive moves of Russia around the 2010s, it has since been manifesting itself in a starkly intense manner. Following this development, Turkey and Indonesia as in-between states could enable the bridge among contesting worldviews. Nevertheless, one shall not be naïve as to dismiss their own political and economic agendas which remain contingent at best.

Before comparing the in-betweenness of Turkey and Indonesia in both their internal and external dimensions, it is crucial to first define in-betweenness.

(A) Definition of In-betweenness

In-betweenness is defined as geographical, historical, political, and cultural intertwining identity and positionality which are not only conditioned by the spatial attribute of one state in relation to others, but also, if not more so, realized and performed by state actors in contingent manners.

In-betweenness of states is characterized by the geographical affiliation with continents, such as Turkey lying in the middle of Asia, Africa, and Europe. It is also performed by the multiple national attachments and importantly, potential rejection as well. Such that in-betweenness transcends the binary distinction of identity and belonging. In portraying the ambiguity in post-colonial state identity, Bhabha (2012) articulates that it "lies in the stage of colonial signifier in the narrative uncertainty of culture's in-between" (Bhabha 2012: 180). The ambiguity, in turn, could be

strategically played out in advancement of political objectives when actors see fit.

In terms of the political economic position of the states, in-betweenness goes beyond the dichotomy of democratic and authoritarian tendencies. It includes supply chain interdependencies, trade relations, and the multiplicity of strategic and symbolic alliances. In-betweenness also goes beyond hedging behavior, a well-established concept in international relations, as it stresses the accent on the importance of culture, identity, sense of community, and belonging. While it aims to diversify the relations and partnerships to avoid over-reliance on one state or block, it is not purely strategic. The interaction between the relational and the strategic aspects of in-betweenness could be one of the entry points of investigation.

In the academic literature, similar terms to in-between states include, while not limited to, torn countries (Huntington 1993) and cusp states (Herzog and Robins 2014). In *The Clash of Civilizations?* (1993), Huntington characterized Turkey as "the most obvious and prototypical torn country" (42) as it bridges three continents and host to a plethora of identities.

The multiplicity of belonging lies in both internal and external dimensions of the state. The influence of domestic and foreign policies on each other goes both ways. While the external behavior of the state can be conditioned by the imagined judgment of domestic audiences, the external political dynamics also formulate and shape the identity construction of citizens and subjects. As the nature of politics, the crosscutting lines of attachment coexist in an uneasy and dynamic equilibrium.

In *The Role, Position and Agency of Cusp States in International Relations* (2014) edited by Herzog and Robins, Chan defines cusp states as:

> "those that are under some significant cross influence or pressure. This broad definition captures a diverse and rich array of phenomena whereby governments and societies are subject to possible identity dissonance, cultural ambivalence, or strategic vulnerability. At the same time, their rather special position at the crossroads of cultures, or as occupants of a pivotal strategic position, confers upon Cusp States important advantages and opportunities to exploit their cultural versatility, to adapt to international trends, and to hedge and balance against competing foreign powers…and that gives their diplomacy special standing, leverage and credibility in the eyes of pertinent foreign audiences. Being located at the intersection of competing foreign spheres of political or cultural influence, and having often attained rather impressive socio-economic-political development, some Cusp States have managed to gain effective diplomatic autonomy in the shadow of their larger neighbors" (168).

(B) Change and Continuities of Turkish in-between: from Kemalist-western modernization to neo-Ottoman foreign policy, promoting multipolarity while

advancing Islamic ideologies

"The most prominent representation of Turkey as in-between has been in reference to Europe and the Middle East" (Altunışık 2014: 25). As such, it "has ties with all, and different levels of historical and cultural affinities with each, and yet is not completely grounded in any of the surrounding regions" (26-27). The in-betweenness has been at times employed in its advantage, while others, it has been suppressed by the embracement of one identity above others (27).

In 2002, the AKP came to power. In 2003 Erdoğan became the Prime Minister. In 2004, Erdoğan's Chief Adviser Ahmet Davutoğlu announced *Zero Problems with the Neighbours* as one of the leading principles of Turkish foreign policies. In his own words, Turkey "should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, which sits at the edge of the Middle East or the West" (Davutoğlu 2007). Instead of limiting Turkey to the two blocks, Davutoğlu argues that "Turkey's new geographical imagination, based on its geography, history and identity, accorded it a new role in mediating" (Altunışık 2014: 36) and wide engagement with the neighborhood, ranging from Africa to Western Balkans.

According to Eralp (2016), "Turkey's transition into active international mediation started as a personal initiative of then–foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in late 2000s" starting from the "dispute between the Palestinian factions, Israeli control of Golan Heights, ongoing civil war in Somalia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina's rocky relationship with its neighbor Serbia" (xiii). And despite "Turkey's general failure to facilitate agreements in most of its mediation efforts, this foreign policy tool became useful domestically" (Altunışık 2014: 38).

Along the same line, changes in foreign policy approaches were often "developed ad hoc by the AKP government due to events on the ground, sensitivities of Turkish public opinion and concerns of the AKP leadership" (Altunisik and Cuhadar 2010: 389).

Beyond efforts at domestic recognition, "Davutoğlu's preference for establishing multiple bilateral alliances on a regional basis, and improved relations with neighboring countries" was also aimed at counterbalancing "traditional allies such as the US, the EU and NATO" (Herzog 2014: 47).

As discussed in the previous sections, while the AKP government implemented neoliberal and democratic reforms during the early 2000s, the systematic denial of EU membership acts as an invitation for them to change course strategically. Graph 4 shows 2005 as the turning point of Turkish democratization efforts, in parallel to the return of the vicious cycle in EU membership application. Turkey also starts to rebalance the external relations (Triantaphyllou 2014) by distancing itself from the west and establishing relations with partner such as Russia, from whom Turkey purchases several weapon systems such as the polemical S-500 aerial missile defense system.

Graph 4: V-DEM data on Turkey (2000-2022)

Source: Varieties of Democracy (2023)

(https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/)

However, the authoritarian turns from 2005 and exacerbated in the 2010s (Tziarras 2022) weren't without consequences for the consistency and legitimacy in its mediating endeavors. Indeed, the "gap between the pro-democracy rhetoric in Turkey's foreign policy and its authoritarian domestic politics is a threat to the credibility of Turkey as a mediator" (Eralp 2016: xiv).

With the domestic presidentialization of politics, autocratization, insistence on neoliberalism, and promotion of political Islam (Roy 1994), "Turkey's in-betweenness has been undermined, ultimately weakening Turkey's position and role" (Altunışık 2022: 1) because it "limits Turkey's pragmatism and flexibility as a mediator in protracted conflicts" (Eralp 2016: xiv). The anachronistic ambition of the AKP to restore the Ottoman past was also called upon by critics as under the call for multipolarity, the expansionist pursuit may well be hidden.

(C) Continuity of Indonesian in-between: pragmatism and balance of power

Indonesia's "foreign policy doctrine of 'bebas dan aktif' ('free and active') was coined by then-Vice President Muhammad Hatta in 1948 as a response to the polarization of the emerging Cold War" (Pitsuwan 2014: 237). In the same speech, he succinctly describes the danger of living in-between bipolar giants as *rowing between two reefs* (Novotny 2010: 300-301). Retrospectively, this vivid illustration still applies to the entangled rivalry characterizing today's great power competitions.

According to Sukma (2003), the

> "politics of *bebas-aktif* as defined by Hatta consisted of four significant premises. First, the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy should be based on an ideological foundation: the state's philosophy of Pancasila[1]. Second, foreign policy should be aimed at safeguarding the national interest as defined by the state's Constitution. Third, the pursuit of national interests would be best served through an independent foreign policy. Fourth, Indonesian foreign policy should be conducted pragmatically, namely, it should be resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the situations and facts it has to face" (25).

While "the foundational nature of Indonesia's independent and active doctrine is a 'constant,'…its implementation could be 'recalibrated'" (Laksmana 2018: 118) depending on the needs at the moment.

Founder and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement since the Cold War era, Indonesia's in-betweenness has been operationalized as "policy of equidistance" and "balancing act" by former president Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001). And by former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as "a thousand friends, zero enemy" echoing Turkish former PM Ahmet Davutoğlu's *Zero Problems with the Neighbours (2004)* doctrine.

"When Yudhoyono proclaimed the 'thousand friends, zero enemy' slogan of his foreign policy, Jokowi bluntly stated, 'What's the point of having many friends but we only get the disadvantages? Many friends should bring many benefits'" (Sulaiman 2019: 616). Following this line of thinking, Indonesian in-betweenness can be characterized as characterized as attracting FDI from diverse state actors in order to counterbalance one from another, in particular, the US, China, and Japan.

In Novotny (2010)'s words, "the current process of China's ascendancy is welcome in Jakarta insofar as it helps Indonesia to eliminate negative implications of the perceived assertive and unilateralist policies of the United States. Yet, the discussion on China also highlighted the elite's continuing deep-rooted suspicions and uneasiness about Beijing's perceived expansionist aspirations" (248).

Indonesian stance towards China illustrates its in-betweenness in a peculiar way as it relates to the fear/respect complex for the Chinese dominance in the distant past, the discrimination and stigmatization towards the ethnic Chinese population in

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[1] Five principles in Sanskrit:
1. Belief in the One and Only God
2. Just and civilized humanity
3. The unity of Indonesia
4. Democratic life led by wisdom of thoughts in deliberation amongst representatives of the people
5. Achieving social justice for all the people of Indonesia
(Paragraph 4 of the Preamble of the Constitution of Indonesia)

Indonesia as they control most of the economic resources and holdings, the deep distrust towards China due to its expansionist threat, and the desperate need for Chinese investment for infrastructure-building. The back and forth of Widodo towards the competing claims of sovereignty in South China Sea illustrates this complex vividly: "a few months after renaming waters around Natuna Island into North Natuna Sea, Indonesia in the end quietly backtracked on renaming the sea" (Sulaiman 2019: 618). For Indonesia and other southeast Asian countries, balancing between national sovereignty along with territorial integrity and trade relations with China is equivalent to walking on the tightrope.

In short, facing the existential threat from and economic dependence on China, "Australia, Japan, India and ASEAN countries are all considered as important elements in Jakarta's hedging strategy…Indonesian policymakers clearly want the country's foreign relations to remain on an open course, and remain multidirectional" (Novotny 2010: 289).

(D) Comparison between Turkish and Indonesian in-between

From the analysis above, one observes that Turkey's in-between character has been shaped by the gradual abandonment of EU membership aspiration in the mid-2000s, and the pursuit to establish diplomatic relations with non-western countries. This runs parallel to the autocratization and concentration of power in the hands of the AKP ruling elites with the instrumentalization of Islam for political gains.

However, in Indonesia, while there is constant recalibration of foreign policies facing changing political environment at home and abroad, non-alignment has remained the strategy to counterbalance one power from another. Since the establishment of the *bebas dan aktif* (free and active) foreign policy doctrine, it has served as the lighthouse to guide the policy makers in troubled waters, as to how to row in two reefs without getting the boat sinking. Nonetheless, when examining the trade dependency of Indonesia on China (in 2020, China is the top trading partner of Indonesia. It represents 19.48% of export market to Indonesia, and 10.5% of total import, see the table in Appendix), the aspiration remains largely constrained by economics. However, Indonesia welcomes other trade partners to mitigate the consequences of over-reliance and potential political influence of China through trade.

Comparatively, with the legacy of NAM, Indonesia tends to avoid choosing sides systematically. Turkey, on the other hand, has been historically aligned with the western camp since the Kemalist establishment, with NATO membership and application of EU membership. However, with the domestic autocratization under AKP, de-Europeanization (Tomini and Gürkan 2020) has been undergoing for more than a decade. In the Turkish context, what characterizes the in-betweenness is the distancing

from the western partners in parallel with the bridging efforts with non-western allies. This is often portrait domestically by the AKP with nationalist sentiments, with slogans such as the "Turkish Century" widely employed ahead of the presidential campaign in May 2023.

In short, contrary to Turkey, who experiences re-orientation of foreign policies with its main partners, Indonesia experiences more continuity than change in terms of the overarching principle of pragmatism and the enterprise of power balance.

(E) Operationalization of in-betweenness in comparison: level of analysis

To synthesize the implicit multi-level comparison above, while elaborating with additional examples, the table below is the preliminary attempt to operationalize the relational, strategic, and identarian aspects of in-betweenness in comparison.

	Turkey	Indonesia
Global	NATO member and a close security ally of the US, but relations deteriorated since 2000s, starting with the disagreement over the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In general, distancing itself from western partners while establishing closer relations with non-western partners.	Trades extensively with China while relies on the US as the "security guarantor". For example, Indonesia refrains from complaining about the Nine-Dash Lines in the South China Sea while its Maritime Security Agency cooperating with U.S. Coast Guard (US Embassy Jakarta 2021)
Regional (integration)	Official candidate of EU membership since 1999, following the Helsinki Summit	One of the founders and host of the headquarter of ASEAN (Jakarta)
International/ regional behavior	-Ambition to revive the Black Sea hegemonic status from the Ottoman era (vs Russian influence from the Soviet era) -Involvement in the Western Balkans by exploring trade linkages and cultural diplomacy (vs EU sphere of influence) -Under the "Africa Rising" narrative, Turkey portraits itself as the leader of anti-colonial struggles against western forces -Self-proclaimed mediator in conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, proxy wars against Russia in Syria	-Partnerships with democratic counterparts in the Indo-Pacific region such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand as counterbalance to Chinese hegemony. -At the G20 in Bali 2022, President Widodo successfully managed to put Biden and Xi on the same table, Zelensky on the screen and Lavrov in the room.
National	AKP's politicization of traditional and religious values (Sunni Islam) to appeal to conservative voters, polarization of societal	Largest Muslim country in the world in terms of population. Since 2000s, politicization of Sunni Islam partially supported by Wahhabi movement

	diversity	from Saudi Arabia.
Sub-national	Kurdish minority in party politics and national identity imagination -with AKP increasing oppression and ethnic-based violence -impacts on Sweden's NATO membership application	The world's largest archipelagic state, Indonesia is home to extremely diverse linguistic and cultural communities with strong local identities. -How does this influence the nation-building process? -Impacts on political parties and electoral system ● Democratization: electoral and party reform: PR system ● Decentralization: district-level politics

Table 2: In-betweenness compared on various levels

Conclusion

We live in extraordinary moments in world history. With rising multipolarity, conflicting claims over the global order are also on the rise.

Underneath the EU's normative discourse on democracy and the rule of law, lies the projection of power and strategic interests of industries. In practice, democracy does not come alone. Democracy comes with many conditions and impositions. The lens of classical realism equips us with attentiveness to the relation and employment of power for politically determined ends. In the age of intense great power competition with entrenched interdependency, in-betweenness allows states to maneuver diplomatic relations. As the external dimension of politics is intricately linked to the domestic one, the way in-betweenness is employed shapes the perception of actors regarding their identities with reference to the others.

While in-betweenness in Turkish foreign policy has transformed from western alignment to the distancing from this club following the sense of rejection by the EU and AKP's consolidation of power, the presence of Japan and the US is welcomed by Indonesia as they offer counterbalance weight to resist Chinese domination.

Only when regional powers like the EU and Japan understand the nature of the political dynamics in their respective neighborhoods, can they effectively cater to the needs of their regional partners, notably Turkey and Indonesia. While this is not a guarantee of diplomatic success, it significantly enhances the legitimacy and credibility of the EU and Japan vis-à-vis their counterparts to foster a more harmonious approach in their respective regions.

In the age of uncertainty, "global engagement on each issue will" no longer resemble "a boxing match—where victory and defeat can be rapidly judged in terms of decisive punches or counter punches—as it will a chess grandmasters' game, where each move will have to be mindful of several other pieces on the board and the game is

played as part of a long strategic interaction" (Khilnani et al. 2012: 9).

Beyond NAM, non-alignment also occurs between normative discourse and practice on the ground. To mitigate this discrepancy to foster a more peaceful and just world order, established power needs to address the real concerns of the emerging powers. And the emerging powers need to seek the common good of global peace and justice. How to translate this ideal to practice is the common struggle of all humankind. And this paper hopes to contribute to this common endeavor no matter how modest this contribution may be.

Limitation

Concrete definition of in-betweenness into operational terms is still in working reflection. How then the operationalizable manifestations of in-betweenness are compared between Turkish and Indonesian foreign policies are the next steps. How to make the concept theoretically grounded while being empirically applicable is crucial.

This paper sometimes jumps from one section to the other as there are multiple foci and approaches. Some questions asked may not be adequately or coherently addressed. The comparability between the relevant units can be questioned.

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Appendix

Graph 5 : V-DEM data on Indonesia (2000-2022)
Source: Varieties of Democracy (2023)
(https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/)

	Turkey	Indonesia

Population	85 million (2023)	273.75 million (2021)
Region	Western Asia (North-eastern Mediterranean)	Southeast Asia (Indo-Pacific)
Religion	Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), other 0.2% (mostly Christians and Jews)	Muslim 87.2%, Protestant 7%, Roman Catholic 2.9%, Hindu 1.7%, other 0.9% (includes Buddhist and Confucian), unspecified 0.4% (2010 est.)
Language	Turkish (official), Kurdish, other minority languages	Bahasa Indonesia (official, modified form of Malay), English, Dutch, local dialects (of which the most widely spoken is Javanese); note - more than 700 languages are used in Indonesia
Ethnic groups	Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 19%, other minorities 6-11% (2016 est.)	Javanese 40.1%, Sundanese 15.5%, Malay 3.7%, Batak 3.6%, Madurese 3%, Betawi 2.9%, Minangkabau 2.7%, Buginese 2.7%, Bantenese 2%, Banjarese 1.7%, Balinese 1.7%, Acehnese 1.4%, Dayak 1.4%, Sasak 1.3%, Chinese 1.2%, other 15% (2010 est.)
Political system	Presidential republic	Presidential republic
GDP	906 current US$ billion (2023)	1.19 current US$ trillion (2021)
GDP per capita	10,661.2 current US$ (2023)	4,332.7 current US$ (2021)
Freedom House score	32/100 (2022) Political rights: 16/40 Civil liberties: 16/60	59/100 (2022) Political rights: 30/40 Civil liberties: 29/60
Life expectancy at birth	75.8 years (2023)	69 years (2020)
GINI index	41.9 (2019)	37.9 (2021)
Top markets (in 2020)	1. Germany (9.42%) 2. United Kingdom (6.62%) 3. United States (6%) 4. Iraq (5.39%) 5. Italy (4.76%)	1. China (19.48%) 2. United States (11.44%) 3. Japan (8.37%) 4. Singapore (6.53%) 5. India (6.37%)
Top exporters (in 2020)	1. China (28%) 2. Germany (8.72%) 3. Russian Federation (7.54%) 4. Others (6.1%) 5. United States (4.9%)	1. China (10.5%) 2. Singapore (9.9%) 3. Japan (8.12%) 4. United States (6.22%) 5. Malaysia (5.25%)
Issue-specific organizations	Council of Europe (1949) NATO membership (1952) OECD (1961)	ASEAN (1967) OIC (1969) APEC (1989)

	OIC (1969)	G20 (1999)
	G20 (1999)	
	EU candidature (1999)	

Table 3: Comparison between Turkey and Indonesia

Source:

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Indonesia (2023)
(https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/indonesia/)

Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Turkey (2023)
(https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/turkey-turkiye/)

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022, Indonesia
(https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2022)

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022, Turkey
(https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2022)

World Bank, GINI index, Turkey and Indonesia compared
(https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=TR-ID)

World Bank, Indonesia (https://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia)

World Bank, Turkey (https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview#1)

World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution, Indonesia
(https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/IDN)

World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution, Turkey
(https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/TUR)